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Populism - A Brief Introduction 
to a Baffling Notion 
By Niels Bjerre-Poulsen 
"Populism in the sense that these pseudointellectuals use it carries overtones of anti 
one religion or another. They don't dare charge me with that, so they just say 
'populism' - it's a sort of highbrow smear." 
George C. Wallace1 
Of all -isms in the vocabulary of political science, "populism" is 
probably the most slippery. Yet - if not for the very same reason - it 
remains appealing both as a term of confession and as a term of abuse. 
Thus no matter how slippery and useless the notion might be, we seem 
to be stuck with it. This is not least true with regard to American politics. 
For the last century the term has been used in connection with all kinds 
of political phenomena, and the meaning of the notion certainly hasn't 
become clearer by this frequent use. Today progressive farmers' organi- 
zations of the Midwest share the term with "radical right" organizations 
such as "Liberty Lobby." 
"Populism" was introduced to the American political vocabulary as a 
self-descriptive term used by the People's Party in the last decade of the 
nineteenth century. The People's Party united a number of radical 
political movements, especially among farmers in the Midwest and the 
South, in a third-party effort that might have become a serious challenge 
to the established party system. The Populist movement was first of all 
a response to the severe social and economic problems that many 
farmers faced, especially after the Civil War. Among these problems 
were financial ones caused by the reintroduction of gold as the only 
monetary standard. This increased the value of the dollar, caused 
interest rates to go up, and made the prices on farm commodities fall. 
Thus, the demand for a monetary reform became an issue of overall 
importance to many farmers. The railroads were another vital problem. 
As a "lifeline," especially to the western states, the railroad companies 
could treat the farmers pretty much as they pleased. And so they did. 
Freight charges were often four times as high as the rates charged in the 
East for similar distances. Small quantities of grain were refused, or had 
to wait until the market was over-supplied and prices started to fall, etc. 
Furthermore, in many western states the railroad corporations had 
sufficient political and economic power to control that their interests 
weren't threatened by the state legislatures. 
In response to their numerous problems, farmers united in various 
"alliances,"and later, when the necessity for direct political action 
became evident, in a political party - the People's Party.' The party 
platform - the socalled Omaha-platform - declared: "We seek to restore 
the government of the Republic to the hands of 'the plain people' with 
whose class it originated."3 It also spoke of "the producing class" and 
stated that "the interests of rural and civic labor are the same; their 
enemies are identical."4 The Omaha platform provided a plan for 
regulation of the supply of agricultural products - "the Subtreasury 
Plan."5 It proposed the reintroduction of "bi-metallism," a graduated 
income tax, state-owned railroads, telegraph and telephone systems, 
government established banks, etc. Furthermore, the populists deman- 
ded shorter working hours in the industry, the banning of Pinkerton 
strike-breakers, restriction of immigrant labor, direct election of US 
senators, secret ballots, and the adoption of the Initiative and Referen- 
dum. 
Although the Populist movement was a short-lived phenomenon, it 
has a lasting impact on American politics. The reform impulse as well 
as many of the actual political issues introduced by the movement were 
adopted by the Progressives at the beginning of this century, and have 
been taken up later as well. Thus the idea of a "populist tradition" in 
American politics has become widely accepted. The character and bias 
of this tradition, however, have become one of the most controversial 
issues in twentieth-century American history. 
The Populist movement went into American historigraphy with a 
rather sympathetic image. John D. Hicks, whose study "the Populist 
Revolt7'6 for many years was considered the most authoritative work on 
the subject, viewed the populist movement as a progressive political 
phenomenon with visions far ahead of its time. It was not until the early 
fifties that this favorable view of populism was seriously challenged. 
Inspired by newly emerged theories of "the authoritarian personality," 
mass society, etc., historians and sociologists such as Richard Hof- 
stadter, Seymour M. Lipset, Talcott Parsons, and Edward Shils now 
turned their attention towards the political and cultural milieu that 
populism emerged from rather than the actual political issues. This led 
to a number of critical interpretations that more or less presented the 
Populist movement as a political neurosis promoted by the fear of being 
left behind by industrialization. Most of these scholars were themselves 
more or less traumatized by McCarthyism and the popular support that 
McCarthy apparently enjoyed. Richard Hofstadter, who wrote the 
perhaps most influential work on populism, "The Age of Reform," 
frankly admitted this in the introduction to the book: "I do not wish to 
deny or minimize, my own interest has been drawn to that side of 
Populism and Progressivsm - particularly of Populism - which seems 
very strongly to foreshadow some aspects of the cranky pseudoconser- 
vatism of our timel'7 Hofstadter saw a continuity from the Populist 
movement to McCarthyism - a Populist-Progressive tradition that had 
"turned sour along the way."8 The same view was expressed by Edward 
Shils (among others), who in "The Torment of Secrecy" called 
McCarthy "the heir of La Folette."g McCarthy was not just viewed as 
an offspring from the Populist tradition, but also as a natural conse- 
quence. What he had brought out in the open had apparently been 
latent features of populism all along. Or  as Peter Viereck expressed it: 
"Beneath the sane economic demands of the populists of 1880-1900 
seethed a mania for xenophobia, Jew-baiting, intellectual-baiting, and 
thoughtcontrolling lynch-spirit."lo In many of the critical interpreta- 
tions it was also argued that the ideological continuity was matched by 
a continuity in the social base from the populist movement to McCar- 
thyism. 
The views of McCarthyism presented by Hofstadter, Shils, Viereck, 
and others have of course provoked strong reactions and have been 
challenged by more favorable views. C. Vann Woodward's essay, "The 
Populist Heritage and the Intellectual" points out the remarkably 
tolerant attitude that characterized the populist's relations to the black 
population.1l In The Populist Response to Industrial America by Norman 
Pollack, Populism is viewed as a progressive social movement that with 
the necessary political power could have changed American society in a 
socialist direction.12 Perhaps the most weighty arguments against the 
views presented by Hofstadter et al. are found in Michael Paul Rogin's 
The Intellectuals and McCarthy. 13 Through a number of casestudies, Rogin 
refutes the thesis of continuity in the social base from the Populist 
movement to McCarthyism. He points out that McCarthy didn't have 
his ideological offspring in the populist tradition, but rather in tradi- 
tional conservatism. Rogin does admit, though, that McCarthy used 
"populist rhetoric," but points out that this is a common feature of 
American culture, irrespective of political opinion. Further, he points 
out that the nativist and racist views that have been ascribed to the 
populists were a general phenomenon - especially in that part of the 
population from which the Populist movement gained its support - but 
that these views actually were less prominent among populists than 
among the population as a whole. 
The main assumption behind the idea of "the populist tradition" is 
that a continuity between various political phenomena has existed since 
the populist movement of the late nineteenth century. But what con- 
stitutes this continuity? An ideological core? Certain political issues? A 
specific political style? Questions such as these might pose other more 
general questions about the very meaning of the term "populism," but 
these more general questions have apparently never been of great 
interest to American scholars. Although the Populist movement has 
been the subject for a large number of studies, only a few general studies 
on "populism" have been published so far. The following is meant as a 
brief introduction to some of the general problems concerning the 
notion of "populism" as well as to some of the methods proposed so far 
in dealing with these problems. 
Differences in the interpretation of the term "Populism" as well as the 
lenient way in which it is often being used are first of all due to the 
absence of an adequate definition. Demarcation seems almost impos- 
sible. Defining the concept in order to cover only a reasonable number 
of political phenomena, previously labeled "populist," necessitates 
formulations so vague that the definition would have no practical 
applicability. On the other hand, a concise definition would necessarily 
be too narrow for most of the actual political phenomena labeled as 
"populist." None of these possibilities seems to take us much further. 
However, some attempts have been made to find an adequate defini- 
tion. One of the few general publications dealing with the concept of 
populism, Populism its Meanings and National Characteristics, edited by 
Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner,l4 is based on a conference on the 
subject, "To Define Populism." All proposals put forward on this 
conference seem to suffer from one of the two shortcomings mentioned 
above. To give a few examples: "Populism proclaims that the will of the 
people as such is supreme over every other standard."l5 "Any creed or 
movement based on the following major premises: Virtue resides in the 
simplest people, who are the overwhelming majority, and in their collec- 
tive traditions."16 "The belief that the majority opinion is checked by an 
elitist rninorityl7l7 
While these three definitions are very general, the following suggested 
definitions are very narrow: "The socialism which (emerges) in back- 
ward peasant countries facing the problems of modernization."18 "A 
political movement which enjoys the support of the mass of the urban 
working class and/or peasantry but which does not result from the 
autonomous organizational power of either of these two sectors."lg 
Since most of the proposed definitions only seem to add to the confu- 
sion as to the concept of Populism, one might start out with something 
less than an all-embracing definition. In her book, Populism, Margaret 
Canovan has tried to avoid the problems of finding an adequate defini- 
tion by using a descriptive typology.20 By separating into various types 
of Populism, it is possible to establish a clear distinction between the 
individual phenomena and then focus on possible connections and over- 
laps. Margaret Canovan has suggested seven different "types" divided 
into two major categories: 
Agrarian Populism 
1. Farmers' radicalism (e.g., the U.S. People's Party) 
2. Peasant movements (e.g., the East European Green Rising) 
3. Intellectual agrarian socialism (e.g., the Narodniki in Russia) 
Political Populism 
4. Populist dictatorship (e.g., Peron) 
5. Populist democracy (i.e., calls for referendums and "participation") 
6. Reactionary populism (e.g., George Wallace and his followers) 
7. Politicians' populism (e.g., broad, nonideological coalition-building 
that draws on the unificatory appeal of "the peoplen)21 
The above categories are analytical constructs and none of them will 
probably cover actual political phenomena entirely. While these might 
be close to one category, they may well overlap several categories - 
though not all. An understandable objection to Margaret Canovan's 
typology would of course be that it is arbitrary. In principle an infinite 
number of classifications of this kind could be made. Although the 
typology doesn't bring us any closer to an explanation of the notion of 
populism - that is, if there is anything to explain - it does provide some 
clarification regarding the nature of some of the political phenomena 
usually referred to as "populist." 
Most attempts to define "populism" have been based on the assump- 
tion that different kinds of populism are varieties of the same kind of 
thing. Thus the proposed definitions have tried to strike a central core 
typical of all populist phenomena. But it might be that 'such a core 
doesn't exist - that populism is not a specific ideology consisting of a 
number of logically interrelated elements. For further explorations into 
the nature of "populism" then, it might be more fruitful to follow Peter 
Wiles' suggestion and regard populism as "A Syndrome, Not a Doc- 
trine."22 Peter Wiles has suggested an approach that isolates a number 
of populist elements that form a syndrome rather than a unity. These 
elements can be combined in a variety of ways, and can also be detached 
and recombined. To mention a few American examples: The Populist 
movement was among other things characterized by a combination of 
"farmers' radicalism" and "populist democracy" (e.g., the use of 
popular initiatives and referendums). "Populist democracy" was taken 
up by the Progressives - "farmer's radicalism" was not. On the other 
hand, "farmer's radicalism" was taken up by Huey Long, but in his 
instance "populist democracy" was replaced by "charismatic leader- 
ship." 
Although no central core unites all instances of populism, there are at 
least a few elements that in some form seem to provide a common 
feature: appraisal of - and appeal to "the people," and anti-elitism. Un- 
fortunately both can take a considerable number of forms. The notion 
of the people can refer to the peasants, the workers, the entire nation or 
just anyone except "the people's enemies.'' In the same way, the tactical 
use of the notion of "the people" stretches from the reconciliatory 
accentuation of common national interests without regard to class 
distinctions and political divergences, over the celebration of "the 
common man" to a directly anti-elitists usage where "the People" 
represents one side in a social dualism (e.g., "The People Vs. the 
Plutocrats"). 
The other mutual element, anti-elitism, is just as vague and 
ambiguous as the notion of "the people." It ranges from the general 
antagonisms towards professional politicans, intellectuals, big finance, 
big business, etc., to antagonisms towards personified conspiratorial 
power-elites (e.g., "Illuminati," "the New Orleans Ring" and "the Bil- 
derbergers.)" 
As another aspect of anti-elitism, one often finds what might be called 
"the worship of the Little Man" - the admiration of "the Little Man's" 
quiet heroism, his common sense and his uncorrupted nature. To 
politicians the concept has the obvious advantage that it doesn't require 
any class definition. The little man can as well be a small manufacturer 
as a worker. He is only defined in his antagonism towards the elite. In 
the same manner as the concept of "the Little Man" can unite sup- 
porters in their antagonism towards the elite it can also legitimize the 
populist leader. As a spokesman for all "little men" his political leader- 
ship almost achieves the dimensions of a direct democracy. 
If we leave the more general problems concerning the meaning of 
"populism" for now, and turn our attention towards "the populist 
tradition" in American politics, we find an illustrative example of how 
widely differently it can be used by comparing George C. Wallace and 
Jimmy Carter - two politicians who have both been associated with the 
notion of "populism." 
When Jimmy Carter during his election-campaign was asked 
whether he was a liberal or a conservative, he evaded the question by 
describing himself as a "populist."23 AS a former governor in Georgia, 
Carter could give some justification to his claim on the southern populist 
tradition (he even had an uncle named after the populist leader Tom 
Watson). In his discharge of office, however, there wasn't much resem- 
blance to the Populist movement. Where for his part George Wallace 
had largely increased government spending during his time as governor 
in Alabama, the balanced budget was almost a cardinal deed for Carter. 
The major justification for Carter's claim to the populist tradition was 
his status as an "outsider" in relation to the political establishment. 
' Although nobody becomes President of the United States without great 
political ambitions, the support of a huge organization and solid 
financial backing, Carter managed to take advantage of the traditional 
mistrust of professional politicians, powerful intermediaries, etc., 
embodied in the populist tradition - indeed an obvious advantage in the 
wake of Watergate. Time after time he echoed the Jacksonian insistence 
on giving the government back to the people. 
There seem to be two types of populist leader, i.e., "the charismatic 
leader" and "the representative citizen." While populist leaders such as 
William Jennings Bryan and Huey Long belong to the former category, 
Jimmy Carter belongs to the latter. Carter justified his mandate to speak 
on behalf of the people with his own social background, as well as with 
the fact that he had been elected President of the United States without 
being an "insider" of the political establishment. Carter clearly ex- 
pressed this view in his Acceptance-speech at the National Democratic 
party convention in July, 1976: "... I derived my political support, my 
advice and my concern directly from people themselves, not from 
powerful intermediaries or representatives of special-interest groups."24 
Carter used a lot of energy to maintain his image as "the ordinary 
American.'' Time after time he stressed his provincial background, his 
experiences as an independent businessman and as a farmer ("We 
haven't had a farmer in the White House since Thomas JeffersonV).25 
However, Carter never used his political mandate against any "powerful 
intermediaries." The faint echoes of radicalism in his rhetoric never 
resulted in any definite proposals for reform. Though it would probably 
be unjust to label Carter a political demagogue, his populist confession 
was first of all an attempt not to be labeled as either liberal or conserva- 
tive - an understandable wish, considering the "catch-all" nature ofthe 
American party-system. With reference to Margaret Canovan's typo- 
logy, Carter's populism could be labeled as "politicians populism," i.e., 
a political technique rather than an ideology. 
If Jimmy Carter labeled himself 'populist" to avoid being labeled as 
either liberal or conservative, George Wallace skillfully avoided using 
the term for the same reasion. Instead he described himself as "a conser- 
vative who supports the little man."26 Both his liberal and his conserva- 
tive opponents, however, labeled him a "populist," though for opposite 
reasons. When liberals used the term in connection with Wallace they 
referred to a special kind of demagogic appeal that reveals a gap between 
the reactionary, authoritarian and chauvinistic views of "the people" 
and the progressive, tolerant views of a cosmopolitan elite. When 
conservative opponents accused Wallace of being a "populist," it was the 
welfare-liberalist George Wallace they criticized. James Ashbrook, 
chairman of the American Conservative Union, stated prior to the elec- 
tion in 1968: "True Conservatism cannot be served by George Wallace. 
At heart his is a populist with strong tendencies in the direction of a 
collectivist welfare state ..."27 Similar statements were made by promi- 
nent conservatives such as William F. Buckley and Barry Goldwater, 
who among other things called Wallace a "New Deal Populist1728 
Actually one could find some justification for both views. Wallace 
never missed a chance to tell his voters who they could blame for the rise 
in crime and violence, the social unrest, the enforced racial integration 
and the decline in national pride: the intellectuals. He had a special flair 
for getting at people's inferiority complexes by telling them with what 
contempt they were regarded by the intellectual elite. It was not only the 
intellectuals as a social group, but intellect as such he attacked. "The 
people" had an intuitive understanding of right and wrong, a common 
sence that the intellectuals had lost for some reason: "You are just one 
man and woman. You are just as good as he is. And in fact the average 
capdriver in this country, and the beautician, the steelworker, the rubber 
worker, the textile worker, knew instinctively when he saw him that 
Castro was a communist. So we may be better than they are ... And we 
are going to show them in November that the average American is sick 
and tired of all those over-educated ivory-tower folks with pointed heads 
looking down their noses at us."29 
The view of George Wallace as a "New Deal Populist" can also be 
justified. Long before he was elected governor of Alabama, he had 
placed himself in the southern populist tradition. During his time in the 
state legislature he had proposed an increase in retirement pensions, 
better unemployment benefits for civil servants and free places for needy 
students. As governor he introduced the largest budget in the history of 
Alabama. He increased unemployment benefits, retirement pensions 
and medical aid. He gave all teachers a raise, built more than 20 new 
high-schools and trade-schools and introduced free textbooks. By the 
end of Wallace's time in office, Louisiana was the only state where more 
people received some kind of social benefit than in Alabama. As one 
politician remarked: "He did what all the Populists have aleays dreamed 
of doing1730 
When Wallace ran for president in 1968, his party-platform had many 
striking resemblances to the platform of the People's Party - especially 
on some of the social issues. The party-platform was only of minor 
importance to Wallace's election campaign, but as attempts were made 
by the Nixon camp to undercut his populist appeal - especially by 
promoting Spiro Agnew as an alternative - Wallace responded with an 
even stronger populist appeal. In several speeches he launched attacks on 
"Eastern money interests" and claimed that he had always supported 
the unions in Alabama.31 Thus Wallace, contrary to Carter, used "the 
populist tradition" to give profile to his candidature. 
The conclusions that one can draw from the comparison of George 
Wallace and Jimmy Carter would rather be to apply it to the notion of 
"populism" than to either of the two. The fact that it can be used in such 
widely different ways as in the cases of Jimmy Carter and George 
Wallace, even within a narrow political context, clearly dustrates its lack 
of substance. The notion might imply a rhetoric tradition, a political 
style, a bias towards certain segments of the society, etc. It does not, 
however, imply a consistent ideology of rationally interrelated elements. 
In other words, various characteristics ascribed to specific "populist" 
phenomena are not united by a central core. 
If the notion of "populism" had been conceived by social scientists, it 
would surely have been rejected as a poor and useless invention. Now 
that it does exist, however, the only thing to do seems to be to acknow- 
ledge that populist phenomena can be widely different sorts of things 
with just a few - if any - common features. Since the various elements 
of one populist phenomenon do not necessarily form a logical interrela- 
tionship, one should be vary careful in drawing conclusions abbut other 
phenomena on the basis of a few comparative features. Maybe "popu- 
lism" would not have been such a controversial issue in American 
I history if a larger part of the discussion had been devoted to the meaning 
of the notion itself. 
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